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ABSTRACT 
When two aircraft were deliberately flown into the World 
Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, the 
aviation industry changed forever. The Federal Aviation 
Administration and the new Department of Homeland Security 
changed the regulations regarding the aviation industry, and 
some of the bystanders throughout this process were the 
airports. Revenues decreased while expenses increased, 
creating a very difficult financial situation for the 
airports. 
The country was divided into four regions and one airport 
from each of the three airport hub categories was selected for 
each region through a stratified random sampling process. 
Financial data for the time period 2000-2003 for the airports 
selected was collected and analyzed to find the financial 
impact that September 11, 2001 had on the airports. 
Throughout the research it became clear that all airports 
were financially affected by September 11, 2001; and that the 
geographical location played a role in the financial impact. 
Airports in the west regions were less affected than airports 







 After July of 2000 the economy slowed down dramatically 
and one of the first industries affected by such an economic 
shift is the aviation industry. The traveling public reduces 
their time spent vacationing and traveling during recessions, 
and this impacts the aviation industry immediately. Then, on 
September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon were the beginning of the end of 
flying the way we used to know it. New regulations were rather 
quickly enforced, and the price tag for the new regulations is 
still undetermined. However, it is obvious that it has 
impacted and will continue to impact airlines as well as 
airports. Airport operators are also dependent on the 
financial stability of the airlines operating at the airport 
since an airline’s bankruptcy can result in a detrimental loss 
of revenue for the airport operator. 
 There are several sources of revenue for airports, 
whereas one of the most volatile sources of revenue for the 
airports is the revenue generated through their concessions 
and the passengers and visitors using these concessions. When 
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visitors were denied access through security checkpoints, 
these stores immediately lost parts of their revenue base, a 
loss that may result in a considerable impact on an airport’s 
revenue. 
 The suspension of flights following September 11 and the 
decrease in travel among both businesses and the general 
public have obviously decreased the amount of money being 
collected by the airports through the passengers. This will 
affect budget planning as well as profit margins for the 
airports, but for how long is still unforeseen. 
Purpose of the Study 
 This study is being undertaken to analyze the impact the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the economic 
recession have had on a very volatile service industry, the 
airports. With the new regulations being put into effect one 
by one, the impact on the airports must be noticeable. Exactly 
how it will affect them in the future is yet to be determined, 
and this paper will aid in the understanding of how the 
airports are affected and how they may manage the changes for 
their own financial benefit; or whether or not they are being 
put in the passenger seat by the new regulations, leaving them 




Statement of the Problem 
 Most airports base their income on passenger fees, lease 
agreements, and percentages of sales from the concessions and 
stores at the airport. The few days all flights were cancelled 
were only the beginning of the financial difficulties airports 
started to encounter. The airports were no longer able to 
allow guests through their security checkpoints. This must 
have significantly decreased the income generated as a part of 
lease agreements since the customer base for many stores and 
concessions has been more than cut in half.  
 The effect all this has on airports of different sizes is 
also an issue needing attention. Larger airports do often have 
a majority of their stores between the security checkpoint and 
the gates, while smaller airports don’t have many stores, if 
any, located between the security checkpoint and the gates. 
However, any decrease in the profit margin for small airports 
can be detrimental for their operations since they operate 
within a small budget; larger airports operate with a much 
larger budget and may be better equipped to handle such 
challenges in the long run. 
 With airports being very susceptible to fluctuations in 
the number of passengers coming through the airport, steps may 
have to be taken to lessen the dependability on this source of 
income. Since passenger enplanements will always be determined 
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by external forces such as the state of the economy, threats 
of terrorist attacks, and wars, it would be beneficial to find 
alternate sources of revenue to secure much needed revenues 
for the airports.  
Significance of the Study 
 This study will show how airports of all sizes are 
affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
how the different geographical regions have been affected 
during the time period 2000-2003. 
Research Questions 
The research questions this study will attempt to answer 
are: 
1. What is the financial impact on airports of 
September 11, 2001?  
2. How do small, medium, and large hub airports 
compare as to how they are affected financially 
by the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001?  
3. How are the different geographical regions 
affected by September 11, 2001? 
Conceptual/Theoretical Framework 
 Different forms of ownership and management can change 
how any organization or company is run as well as the 
profitability of the company. For airports, the independence 
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from the local government can change the way decisions are 
made to better benefit the airport and not making decisions 
based on political needs or desires.  
 During good times the general public travels more than 
they will do when there is an economical downturn. Enplanement 
data will show this relationship and how it has been over the 
time period studied. A connection can be drawn to the 
economical theory of supply and demand. Is there any 
connection between available seats from the airlines to the 
demand from the business travelers as well as the general 
public? Since a decrease in the demand for air travel may 
cause airlines to reduce the number of flights they offer, 
this will reduce the airports’ revenues that are based on 
landing fees as well as concessions in the terminal. 
Definitions 
Large Hub: an airport with at least 1 percent of the total 
passenger enplanements 
Medium Hub: an airport with between 0.25 and 1 percent of 
the total passenger enplanements 
Small Hub: an airport with between 0.05 and 0.25 percent of 
the total passenger enplanements 
Nonhub: an airport with less than 0.05 percent of all 
commercial passengers, but more than 10,000 annually 
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Other commercial airport: airports enplaning 2,500 to 
10,000 passengers annually 
Financial Impact: The change in profit margins directly 
related to a set factor. 
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration 
TSA: Transportation Security Administration 
PFC: Passenger Facility Charges 
AIP: Airport Improvement Program 
Assumptions 
1. All airports have been affected financially by the 
security measures put into effect after September 11, 
2001. 
2. The impact of September 11 has resulted in fewer 
passengers. 
Limitations 
 The study will have some limitations. One limitation is 
the number of airports that can be thoroughly studied in a 
timely manner. Another limitation is the relatively short 
period of time that has elapsed since September 11, 2001; 
therefore, the full ramifications of the tragedy will not yet 
be known. A third limitation is the availability of the 
financial statements to be studied and the different 







 This chapter will review the literature available on 
airports’ financial situation and the financial impact the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had. The literature is 
airport and aviation specific with an emphasis on the sources 
of revenues that airports have and how these may have changed 
in the recent months following 9-11. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature consisted of financial statements from 
diverse airports around the country, whereas the airports 
categorized as hubs were the ones primarily studied. Airports 
enplaning less than 0.05 percent of all commercial passengers 
annually were not a part of this study. A major part of the 
literature review was to explore airports’ sources of income 
and how they have changed since September 11, 2001. Also 
reviewed were the different forms of airport ownership and how 
this may have affected the use of resources and funding 
available, as well as the profits from operating the airports. 
The main source of revenue that has been impacted after 
September 11 has been through passengers. Enplanement data was 
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reviewed to understand how much of an effect the reduced 
amount of travel may have had on the airports’ profit margins. 
Airports’ Sources of Income 
 There are several major sources for airport funding. 
These are airport user charges, airport revenue bonds, 
passenger facility charges, the airport improvement program, 
and state and local programs. Table 1 shows the major sources 
of airport capital funding. 
Table 1. Major Sources of Airport Capital Funding (billions $) 
Funding Sources 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Airport Revenue 
Bonds 
4.6 3.6 4.8 1.6 3.0 3.2 4.0 
AIP Grants 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 
PFCs n/a n/a 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 
State/Local Grants 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total $ 6.5 $ 5.5 $ 7.3 $ 4.4 $ 6.0 $ 6.2 $ 7.1
n/a = not applicable 
Source: The American Association of Airport Executives, “America’s 
Future in Airport Infrastructure” (FAA/OTS Task Force Study, 1999) 
 
Aeronautical user charges are landing fees; apron, gate-
use or parking fees; fuel-flowage fees; and terminal charges 
for use of passenger hold rooms, ticket counters, baggage 
claims, administrative support, hangar space, and cargo 
buildings. Non-aeronautical user charges include rentals and 
fees to terminal concessionaires, automobile parking, rental 
car fees, rents and utilities for facilities, non-aviation 
development fees, and communication fees (Quilty, 1999). 
 Airports lease terminal space to airlines based on three 
types of agreements, compensatory, residual, and hybrid 
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(FAA/OST Task Force Study, 1999). Under a compensatory 
agreement, airline tenants are charged fees and rental charges 
in an amount to recover the actual cost of operating the 
facilities they use. Under this approach the airport operator 
assumes the financial risk of operating the airport, but at 
the same time retains all surplus profits for its own use. A 
compensatory approach allows the airport operator to strive 
for profit through good management techniques. When using a 
compensatory approach, the primary goal of the agreements is 
to ensure a reliable stream of revenue (Quilty, 1999). 
 With residual agreements, airlines agree to pay any costs 
of operating the airport that are not allocated to other users 
or covered by non-airline revenues. The financial risk is 
therefore transferred to the airlines, which in return receive 
a negotiated return on an airport’s surplus profits (Quilty, 
1999). 
 Hybrid agreements contain elements from both compensatory 
and residual agreements, and have become more popular since 
the airline deregulation. However, the use of hybrid 
agreements limits an airport’s control of its sources and uses 
of funds, but it can be used to reduce the financial risks 
faced by an airport (FAA/OTS Task Force Study, 1999). See 
table for the distribution of the agreement types for large, 
medium, and small hub airports. 
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Table 2. Airport Use and Lease Agreements 
Distribution by Type and Airport size (percent) 
Use and Lease Large Medium Small 
Residual 41% 38% 57% 
Compensatory 41% 19% 14% 
Hybrid/Other 18% 43% 29% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Respondents 
Number 
22 21 14 
Source: Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA), “1998 Airport 
Gate Availability/PFC Survey” 
 
 Airport concessions are intended to provide revenues for 
the airport while food, beverage, retail, and other service 
amenities are provided to passengers (Quilty, 1999). Most 
lease agreements for concessions require annual minimum 
payments, percentage of gross revenue payments, or a 
combination of the two. Rates and charges can be determined by 
gross revenue per square foot, gross revenue per enplaned 
passenger, net revenue per square foot, or net revenue per 
enplaned passenger. 
 One factor affecting concession revenue is the location 
of the concession relative to the security checkpoint. With 
the concessions located outside the security checkpoint, they 
are limited to only having access to guests and passengers yet 
to enter through the security checkpoints. Transferring 
passengers not desiring to exit the secure area will not have 
any access to these concessions. If the concessions are within 
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the secure area, they benefit from the increased exposure to 
ticketed or transferring passengers in the secured concourses 
and lobbies (Quilty, 1999). However, with the recent changes 
only allowing ticketed passengers through security, these 
concessions are hurt by visitors not having access to the 
secure areas. 
 Car rental concessions usually have rates based on a 
percentage of gross revenue. The definition of gross revenue 
can be detrimental to the amount of revenue that will be 
available to the airport since rental car companies have add-
on charges associated with insurance and fuel purchases. They 
also have remote sites where cars are assigned, and these will 
not be included in the terminal lease (Quilty, 1999). 
Recently, some airports are moving toward a collaborative 
effort with car rental companies in which percentage breaks 
are given after a certain volume has been attained. 
 In 1990 The Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act 
allowed airports to charge enplaning passengers a $1, $2, or 
$3 facility charge in accordance with FAA regulations. In 
April 2000 the PFC program was amended and airports are now 
able to charge $1, $2, $3, $4, or $4.50 per enplaning 
passenger. There are federal regulations governing the use of 
PFC monies; the allowable uses are as follows: 
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• Pay all or part of the allowable cost of an 
approved project 
• Pay bond associated debt service and financing 
costs 
• Combine PFC funds with Federal grant funds to 
accomplish an approved project 
• Apply PFC funds to meet non-federal share of the 
cost of projects funded under the Federal airport 
grant program 
Passenger Facility Charges can only be used to finance 
eligible airport projects that preserve or enhance safety, 
capacity, or security of the national air transportation 
system; reduce noise or its impact; or enhance airline 
competition (FAA/OST Task Force Study, 1999). Medium and large 
hub airports that impose PFC charges face a reduction in the 
AIP apportionment funds they would normally receive. PFCs 
provide an important and growing source of funds to be used to 
improve and expand airport infrastructure. PFCs can also be 
used to fund a broader range of terminal projects than can be 
funded under AIP. 
PFCs are permanently authorized and are not subject to 
congressional re-appropriation. Also, PFCs are earned from 
passenger enplanements and the revenue generated is fairly 
predictable and rising from year to year. However, with the 
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reduced number of travelers after September 11, the amounts 
collected through PFC have been diminishing. Security projects 
that have been approved for use of PFC funding are explosive 
blast mitigation, airside fencing, acquisition of security and 
fire equipment, security checkpoint equipment, portions of a 
police facility, and a perimeter intrusion-detection system 
(FAA/OTS Task Force Study, 1999). 
 Compared to PFC, the regulations governing AIP funds are 
much more rigid. It is still a major source of funds for an 
airport, but their uses are designated. In 2002, the FAA 
awarded $561 million in AIP grant funds to airports for 
security projects related to the events of September 11, 2001 
(FAA/OTS Task Force Study, 1999). This amount was 
approximately 17 percent of the total amount available in AIP 
funding for the fiscal year, the largest amount ever awarded 
for security projects in one single year since the program 
began in 1982. In comparison, the amount in 2001 was a mere 
$57 million. With the passing of the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, existing legislation was amended 
to allow for AIP funding to be used for any security-related 
activity required by law or the Secretary of Transportation 





 There are five types of public airport ownership and 
operation in the United States. An airport may be owned and 
operated by a city, county, state, the federal government, or 
more than one jurisdiction. Some commercial airports are owned 
by one or more government entity, but operated by a separate 
public entity, such as an airport authority (Wells, 1996).  
The legal responsibilities for the daily operations are vested 
in five kinds of governmental or public entities: a municipal 
or county government, a multipurpose port authority, an 
airport authority, a state government, or the federal 
government. 
 Municipally and county operated airports are generally 
run as a department of the city or county, with policy 
decisions made in the broader context of city or countywide 
investment needs and budgetary constraints. Multipurpose port 
authorities have a much broader range of responsibilities, 
from airports and harbors to toll-roads and bridges. These 
port authorities have the status of public corporations with a 
financial independence resting on their ability to issue their 
own debt. Single-purpose airport authorities are similar to 
multipurpose ones, but are more limited on their revenue base 
to run a financially self-sustaining enterprise. State-
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operated airports are managed by the state’s department of 
transportation. 
 There has been a gradual transition from city and county 
controlled airports to the independent single or multipurpose 
authorities. Some of the financial reasoning behind this 
change is that an airport authority can provide efficiency of 
operation and economies of scale when several political 
jurisdictions combine their airport responsibilities under one 
board. Also, authorities can provide on-scene decision makers, 
rates and charges unclouded by off-airport costs, and less 
political impact on the business of running the airport 
(Wells, 1996). 
Enplanement Data 
 Early reports on enplanement data from the FAA show a 
dramatic decrease of seven percent for the year of 2001, which 
only will have a few months of the effect of September 11 in 
its data. However, the freeze on all traffic for a few days 
following the terrorist attacks caused large drops in the 
number of enplanements. Enplanement data for the years 2000 to 
2003 will be analyzed and compared and a trend analysis will 
be performed. 
Financial Data 
 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there 
was a temporary suspension of commercial and general air 
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travel in the United States. This grounding of aircraft led to 
a significant decline in the aircraft and passenger activity 
for the year of 2001, and its effects were still noticeable in 
2002. In December of 2001, the Metropolitan Washington 
Airports Authority received a $40 million payment from the 
federal government to compensate it for the closure and 
reduced flight activity at National. This federal compensation 
was used by the Airport Authority to replace lost revenue, 
replenish unencumbered reserves that were expended, compensate 
concessionaires for losses, and to provide a supplement to the 
landing fees of the airlines operating at National in 2002 
(Office of Finance, 2002). 
 At John Wayne Airport in Orange County, California, air 
carriers resumed services on September 13, 2001. The services 
were at reduced levels and the reduction in passenger activity 
at the airport has had a great financial impact. Based on 
their September and October data, John Wayne Airport 
management projected a 15 percent decrease in activity for the 
fiscal year 2001/02 (Macias, Gini & Company, 2001). Parking 
and rental car revenues were projected to be lower than the 
previous fiscal year and the airport also anticipated more 
than a doubling of their budgeted $4,000 for security costs. 
This increase in security costs will substantially increase 
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operating expenses, even though a part of this cost will be 
borne by the airlines. 
 Table 3 shows the increase or decrease in revenues for 
the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority from 2000 to 
2001. 
Table 3. Change in Revenues from 2000 to 2001 – Metropolitan 
Washington Airport Authority (millions $) 
Classifications Revenue – 2001 Revenue – 2000 Change in Percent 
Concessions 93.4 114.5 (19.3) 
Rents 122.4 119.7 2.3 
Landing Fees 55.8 58.8 (5.1) 
Utility Sales 12.3 13.1 (6.0) 
Passenger 
Fees 
24.4 24.9 (1.9) 
Other 7.2 10.0 (27.6) 
Total 314.6 340.9 (7.7) 
Note: numbers don’t add up due to rounding 
Source: Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority, “Financial Statements 
2001” 
 
In comparison, the expenses have increased from $ 275.1 
million in 2000 to $ 287.4 million in 2001, a 4.2 percent 
increase. This increase in expenses combined with the decrease 
in revenues can cause a hardship on an airport’s profit margin 
as well as the capability to achieve its goals. 
Summary 
 September 11 2001, as well as the economical downturn, 
dramatically decreased airports’ revenues. The most 
predictable source of income over the years has been the 
income derived from Passenger Facility Charges and revenues 
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through terminal concessionaires. Subsequently, with the 
dramatic decrease in the enplanement due to economic hardship 
as well as the terrorist attacks of September 11, airports’ 
revenues decreased as the expenses increased. Without any 
interference from other external sources, this will 
automatically result in a decrease in the profit margins. 
There are several other major sources of airport funding, but 
these are mostly based on federal or state funding and have 
stringent requirements attached to them. What seemed to be the 
most predictable source, has also turned out to be one of the 
most volatile revenue source. 
 Revenues from concessionaires are based on a few 
different approaches, but the bottom line is the number of 
passengers coming through the lines leaving their valuable 
dollars behind at the airport. New federal regulations limit 
the access through security to ticketed passengers only, which 
then has decreased the customer base for all concessions 
located between the security checkpoints and the gates. On the 
other side, concessions located outside the security 
checkpoints will not get to the transferring passengers 
unwilling to go through the rigorous process of passing 
through security again. These revenues now being unavailable, 
results in a large gap between what has been budgeted and as 
to what has been the actual revenue through the concessions. 
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 There are several types of airport ownership that may 
affect how the decisions concerning the operations of an 
airport are made. The trend is toward airport authorities of 
one type or another. With these types of authorities, airports 
stand more freely in making sound business decisions that will 
benefit the airport. In other occasions, decisions may have 
been made for political reasons or to aid other departments of 







 This section will describe the procedures that will be 
used in collecting and analyzing the data for this study. The 
study is quantitative and data is collected from airports’ 
financial statements. Airports have been divided into three 
categories for this study, and the results will be analyzed 
using statistical methods to find any significant differences 
between the airport categories. The United States has been 
divided into four regions to achieve a fair geographical 
representation throughout the study. 
Population 
 The population for this study is all commercial airports 
in the United States with more than 0.05 percent of all 
commercial passengers on an annual basis. Since it is not 
feasible to study all airports in a timely or efficient 
manner, a sample of airports will be used. 
Sample 
 Stratified random sampling will be used to ensure that 
all regions and airport sizes will be fairly represented 
throughout the study. The country will be divided into four 
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regions using the U.S. Census Bureau Regions northeast, 
midwest, south, and west, as shown in the appendix. The 
financial statements of one airport of each category from each 
region will be used for the research. 
Study Design 
 The study will use financial data from available 
financial statements of the airports randomly selected. The 
information required to be disclosed in financial statements 
will be sufficient to analyze the financial situation of the 
airport. Categorized data for revenues and expenses will be 
available and a comparison between the different airports can 
be performed. 
Data Collection Methods/Procedures 
 Data will be collected from publicly available financial 
statements. Data collected will span over four years to 
include the years before and after the terrorist attacks. The 
financial statements will be obtained through the FAA’s web 
site. Financial statements provide a thorough explanation of 
an organization’s financial situation as well as its revenues 
and expenses. Expense and revenue categories are likely to 
differ somewhat, but a generalization will be done to ensure 
that the same data are included in the same general categories 
to provide a valid result. 
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Instrument Reliability and Validity 
 Financial statements are generally very reliable sources 
of information. All data will be analyzed in the same manner 
using the same principles. Financial statements for one 
airport consist of hard numbers than can easily be compared 
with other airports’ numbers. The financial information is 
also issued according to FAA guidelines and requirements, 
making a generalization and comparison easier and more 
reliable and valid. 
Proposed Data Analysis 
 All data will be quantitative and will be compiled in an 
orderly manner to be analyzed. The changes over the years will 
be converted into percentages to better be able to compare the 
data. The change in profits will be expressed as a percentage 
change. An analysis if this data will be performed to find any 
differences between the different categories of airports as 
well as the regions. 
Protection of Human Subjects 
There will be no research involving human subjects. An IRB 






PRESENTATION OF THE DATA 
The data used for this research was obtained from the 
Federal Aviation Administration and all airports are required 
by law to submit all financial data to the FAA. FAA Form 5100-
126 is used to report payments that the airport makes to 
government entities and FAA Form 5100-127 is used to report 
airport revenues, expenses, and other financial information. 
This ensured that all data used in this study is readily 
comparable and reliable. Throughout the data preparation and 
analysis the following categories were examined: landing fees, 
terminal/international arrival area rental or other charge, 
terminal – food/beverage/retail stores/other, rental cars, 
parking, passenger facility charges, operating expenses, law 
enforcement, and net profit. The airports were selected 
through a random stratified sample. Table 4 shows the outcome 






Table 4. Airports Selected for Analysis 





















































 The financial data obtained was entered into a 
spreadsheet and the change from the previous year was 
expressed as a percentage. The data will be cross referenced 
to compare large hub airports, medium hub airports, and small 
hub airports, as well as one region to the other. 
Research Questions 
All the information was obtained and analyzed in order to 
answer the three research questions that this study put forth:  
1. What is the financial impact on airports of 
September 11, 2001?  
2. How do small, medium, and large hub airports compare 
as to how they are affected financially by the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001?  
3. How are the different geographical regions affected 
by September 11, 2001? 
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The following analysis of the financial data will fully answer 
these three questions. 
Data Related to Research Questions 
 All financial data necessary for this study was obtained 
through FAA forms 5100-126 and 5100-127. All changes in 
revenues and expenses are presented as a percentage using the 
year 2000 as a base year. This year was used since it was the 
last full year that was not affected by September 11, 2001. 
 Of the data used in this study, landing fees are directly 
related to the number of flights arriving and departing the 
airport. Terminal rental charge is more rigid than landing 
fees, but can at the same time be used as an indicator of 
airlines’ economical situation. Revenues from terminal food, 
beverage, and retail services are used to indicate the amount 
of travelers using these services, and are directly related to 
the passengers passing through the facility. Rental car 
revenue and parking fees are excellent signs of travelers 
using the airport as their origin or destination of travel and 
they do not get affected by transit passenger. Passenger 
facility charges are also directly related to number of 
passengers on the flights and a good indicator of enplanement 
numbers for the airport. Operating expenses were analyzed to 
find any drastic changes as to those expenses, and the cost of 
law enforcement was the other expense category analyzed. The 
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final category analyzed in the study was net profits to see 
how the airports performed overall in the years following 
September 11, 2001. 
 Table 5 shows the financial situation for the years 2000 
through 2003 for Mc Carran International Airport in Las Vegas, 
NV. 
Table 5. Financial Data Mc Carran International Airport 
 
Mc Carran International, NV 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $29,130,000 $30,017,752 3% $28,348,000 -3% $27,619,402 -5%
Terminal Rental Charge $51,916,000 $56,819,745 9% $54,099,000 4% $59,517,827 15%
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$58,499,000 $59,512,596 2% $68,537,000 17% $70,458,466 20%
Rental Cars $19,749,000 $25,691,198 30% $19,032,000 -4% $19,927,845 1% 
Parking $15,450,000 $17,276,609 12% $17,117,000 11% $17,468,947 13%
Passenger Facility Charges $45,159,000 $46,188,815 2% $44,933,000 -1% $44,945,165 -1%
Operating Expenses $91,092,000 $101,512,310 
11% $111,205,000 22% $118,762,900 30%
Law Enforcement $5,115,000 $5,633,200 10% $7,759,731 52% $9,536,989 86%
Net Profit $199,644,000 $78,341,428 -61% $70,194,000 -65% -$30,069,333  
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
This table clearly shows how Mc Carran International Airport 
financial situation has changed since 2001. In 2002, the 
landing fee revenue generated at the airport dropped by 3 
percent compared to the revenue from 2000. Other numbers of 
significance are the dramatic increases of operating expenses 
and especially law enforcement, which increased and astounding 
52 percent over a two year period. Revenues generated from 
rental cars also decreased by a slight amount from 2000 to 
2002. The calendar year of 2003 noticed the same effects as 
the year 2002, with one exception, the revenues from rental 
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cars were back to 2000 levels. Also, the operating expenses 
and law enforcement expenses continued their recent trend. 
 The medium hub for the west region was Oakland 
International Airport in California, and its financial data is 
presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Financial Data Oakland International Airport 
Oakland International, CA 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $10,209,506 $11,805,025 16% $12,212,651 20% $14,050,610 38% 
Terminal Rental Charge $9,527,707 $12,308,017 29% $14,075,432 48% $15,032,716 58% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$2,689,254 $3,559,333 32% $4,411,179 64% $5,524,586 105%
Rental Cars $7,505,381 $8,756,682 17% $8,834,627 18% $9,710,730 29% 
Parking $26,701,873 $34,306,623 28% $33,526,232 26% $36,783,525 38% 
Passenger Facility Charges $14,180,617 $18,840,357 33% $17,612,879 24% $21,230,645 50% 
Operating Expenses $57,880,770 $68,265,314 18% $82,145,882 42% $89,233,240 54% 
Law Enforcement $1,204,800 $3,026,224 151% $2,525,010 110% $10,977,814 811%
Net Profit $24,598,208 $44,052,412 79% $57,731,435 135% -$14,297,731  
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
For Oakland International Airport, the only numbers that show 
any impact are in the expense category. From 2000 to 2001, 
operating expenses increased by 18 percent, for 2002 they 
increased 42 percent, and for 2003 they had increased by 54 
percent. As for law enforcement expenses, they increased by 
151 percent in 2001, 110 percent for 2002, and an astronomical 
811 percent for 2003. No revenue categories show any reduction 
throughout the years following 2001, but rather a steady 
increase. 
 Palm Springs International Airport in California was 
selected as the airport from the small hub category, and the 
financial data analyzed can be found in table 7. 
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Table 7. Financial Data Palm Springs International Airport 
Palm Springs International, CA 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $1,627,373 $1,494,016 -8% $1,262,538 -22% $1,452,403 -11%
Terminal Rental Charge $1,315,485 $2,054,875 56% $2,377,463 81% $2,478,390 88% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$517,857   $493,964 -5% $508,206 -2% 
Rental Cars    $3,684,258  $3,718,660  
Parking $954,480 $1,054,580 10% $997,824 5% $992,492 4% 
Passenger Facility Charges $1,651,957 $1,631,503 -1% $1,704,307 3% $2,131,451 29% 
Operating Expenses $7,619,357 $8,571,685 12% $8,584,936 13% $9,464,848 24% 
Law Enforcement  $381,204  $498,657  $839,247  
Net Profit -$2,615,595 $2,432,349 193% $4,980,508 290% -$7,935,496  
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
There were no reported expenses for 2000 regarding law 
enforcement so there are no percentage increases showing in 
table 7. However, by using 2001 as a base year instead, the 
change will be an increase of 31 percent in 2002 and an 
increase of 220 percent for 2003. Operating expenses showed 
only a modest increase of 12 percent for 2001 and 13 percent 
for 2002. As for 2003, the increase doubled compared to the 
previous year, a 24 percent increase compared to 2000. In 2002 
there was a significant reduction in landing fees collected by 
the airport authority and it was down by 22 percent. This 
trend started showing even in 2001 with a reduction of 8 
percent, and continued into 2003 resulting in a reduction of 
11 percent. There were also slight changes in the revenues 
generated at the terminal as they were down 5 percent in 2002 
and 2 percent in 2003. 
 In the midwest region, Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky 
International Airport in Cincinnati, Ohio, was selected as the 
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airport to represent the large hub category. Table 8 shows the 
financial data for this airport. 
Table 8. Financial Data Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky 
International Airport 
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International, OH 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $15,827,008 $20,505,498 30% $22,334,379 41% $27,900,998 76% 
Terminal Rental Charge $12,588,725 $13,976,284 11% $14,187,241 13% $13,871,286 10% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$7,097,458 $5,587,405 -21% $6,693,813 -6% $7,209,428 2% 
Rental Cars $3,806,612 $3,656,336 -4% $3,409,655 -10% $3,265,279 -14%
Parking $16,620,465 $15,082,832 -9% $15,127,384 -9% $14,897,244 -10%
Passenger Facility Charges $18,117,705 $7,316,832 -60% $7,312,170 -60% $7,309,645 -60%
Operating Expenses $43,375,025 $45,038,467 4% $49,613,336 14% $53,858,413 24% 
Law Enforcement $1,800   $353,580  $701,400  
Net Profit $104,472,770 $0  $0  -$50,112,066  
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
The table clearly shows that Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky 
International Airport was negatively affected for 2001, 2002, 
and 2003. In 2001, revenues from rental cars and parking 
dropped by 4 and 9 percent respectively. For 2002, these 
numbers were 10 percent for rental cars and 9 percent for 
parking fees. 2003 still showed a reduction with revenues from 
rental cars down a total of 14 percent compared to 2000, and 
parking revenues remaining steady at a decline of 10 percent 
from 2000. Reliable law enforcement expenses were only 
reported for 2002 and 2003, and just over this one year span 
they doubled from $353,580 to $701,400. Landing fees for 
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport have been 
increasing by 30 percent for 2001, 41 percent for 2002, and 76 
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percent for 2003, indicating an increase in the amount of air 
traffic at the airport. 
 Indianapolis International Airport in Indiana was 
selected as the medium hub airport for the midwest region. The 
financial matrix put together for Indianapolis International 
Airport is presented in table 9. 
Table 9. Financial Data Indianapolis International Airport 
Indianapolis International, IN 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $10,938,407 $13,305,526 22% $12,070,480 10% $16,404,968 50%
Terminal Rental Charge $10,707,216 $12,504,346 17% $11,455,358 7% $12,947,656 21%
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$4,446,138 $4,464,078 0% $4,536,470 2% $4,954,711 11%
Rental Cars $6,670,145 $5,923,642 -11% $6,216,476 -7% $6,276,263 -6%
Parking $22,766,113 $22,230,909 -2% $19,798,417 -13% $20,704,266 -9%
Passenger Facility Charges $10,889,937 $13,909,327 28% $14,568,444 34% $15,606,697 43%
Operating Expenses $80,608,222 $31,919,663 -60% $34,625,361 -57% $41,041,883 -49%
Law Enforcement        
Net Profit $80,042,723 $37,281,562 -53% $45,567,121 -43% $2,580,095 -97%
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
There were no law enforcement expenses reported by 
Indianapolis International Airport so this category cannot be 
studied for this airport. As for rental car revenues, they 
decreased by 11 percent in 2001, 7 percent in 2002, and 6 
percent in 2003; and parking fee revenues decreased by 2 
percent, 13 percent, and 9 percent in the same years 
respectively. All other financial categories show good to 
modest improvements for the years analyzed with landing fees 
increasing by 22 percent for 2001, 10 percent for 2002, and 50 
percent for 2003. Revenues from terminal services also 
increased by 2 percent from 2000 to 2002 and an additional 9 
percent the following year to a total of 11 percent for 2003. 
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In 2001, passenger facility charges increased by 28 percent in 
2001; and it continued to climb to 34 percent for 2002, and 43 
percent for 2003. 
 The final airport to be studied in the midwest region 
belongs to the small hub category and was Des Moines 
International Airport in Iowa. The financial data for this 
airport is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Financial Data Des Moines International Airport 
Des Moines International, IA 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $4,246,096 $4,148,540 -2% $4,646,640 9% $5,004,725 18% 
Terminal Rental Charge $3,258,940 $3,484,170 7% $4,242,614 30% $5,303,818 63% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$739,498 $648,188 -12% $493,964 -33% $792,020 7% 
Rental Cars $1,672,665 $1,674,359 0% $1,811,952 8% $1,825,163 9% 
Parking $3,166,278 $4,279,444 35% $4,928,503 56% $5,664,725 79% 
Passenger Facility Charges $2,223,300 $2,456,542 10% $3,204,412 44% $3,614,075 63% 
Operating Expenses $10,217,156 $10,842,439 6% $12,270,364 20% $16,831,571 65% 
Law Enforcement $556,368 $607,828 9% $886,833 59% $2,650,784 376%
Net Profit $20,635,815 $29,820,579 45% $18,503,786 -10% $3,076,625 -85%
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
In 2001, operating expenses had increased by a normal 6 
percent; however, in 2002 the increase was 20 percent and in 
2003 they had increased by 65 percent compared to the expenses 
of 2000. Law enforcement expenses increased in 2001 by 9 
percent, a rather modest increase, but in 2002 it was up to 59 
percent, and in 2003 it was up by 376 percent. Revenues 
generated through agreements with rental car companies showed 
no increase for 2001, but increased by 8 percent for 2002 and 
9 percent in 2003, a modest increase. Perking revenues 
increased by 35 percent, 56 percent, and 79 percent for the 
years 2001, 2002, and 2003 respectively. Terminal revenues 
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decreased in 2001 by 12 percent and 33 percent in 2002 before 
it rebounded and had a net gain of 7 percent in 2003 compared 
to 2000 levels. Passenger facility charges also showed a 
steady increase throughout the period from 2000 through 2003 
with increases of 10 percent for 2001, 44 percent for 2002, 
and 63 percent for 2003. 
 Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, was 
in this study selected as the representative for the large hub 
category out of the northeast region. Table 11 shows the 
financial data for Logan International Airport, the one 
airport in the study that may be affected the most by 
September 11, 2001, being the place where hijackers were able 
to get on the planes used for the attacks. 
Table 11. Financial Data Logan International Airport 
Logan International, MA 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $52,929,656 $56,141,196 6% $49,655,739 -6% $68,969,207 30% 
Terminal Rental Charge $39,346,134 $39,850,099 1% $41,164,483 5% $46,418,867 18% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$21,286,453 $16,549,432 -22% $18,547,508 -13% $18,311,536 -14%
Rental Cars $20,280,504 $19,814,090 -2% $15,084,859 -26% $19,983,138 -1% 
Parking $71,107,801 $73,268,967 3% $64,006,733 -10% $75,380,757 6% 
Passenger Facility Charges $41,296,309 $36,318,437 -12% $29,442,073 -29% $29,089,720 -30%
Operating Expenses $139,776,226 $163,649,958 17% $155,654,156 11% $173,817,370 24% 
Law Enforcement        
Net Profit $172,885,151 $93,162,522 -46% $65,369,977 -62% -$59,727,147  
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
For the year 2001, Logan International Airport’s revenues from 
services offered at the terminal dropped by 22 percent 
compared to the previous year. The reduction in revenue from 
terminal services was still 13 percent in 2002 and 14 percent 
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in 2003. There was even a reduction of 6 percent on revenue 
generated by landing fees in 2002, but in 2003 it rebounded to 
an increase of 30 percent in comparison to 2000. Revenue 
generated through agreements with the rental car companies 
decreased by 2 percent in 2001, 26 percent in 2002, and was 
back close to 2000 levels in 2003 with a reduction of a mere 1 
percentage point. The year of 2002 was the only one that shows 
a negative trend in parking fee revenue with a reduction 10 
percent compared to 2000, in 2003 the revenue was 6 percent 
higher than that of 2000. Throughout the time period studied, 
the revenue through passenger facility charges steadily 
declined by 12 percent in 2001, 29 percent in 2002, and 30 
percent in 2003. Law enforcement expenses were not reported by 
Logan International Airports and were therefore not considered 
for this airport. Operating expenses jumped by 17 percent from 
2000 to 2001, and then dropped back to an 11 percent increase 
for 2002. In 2003 the operating expenses were back up by 24 
percent compared to 2000. 
 The airport selected in the medium hub category for the 
northeast region was Albany International Airport in New York 






Table 12. Financial Data Albany International Airport 
Albany International, NY 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $3,233,391 $4,366,678 35% $4,992,747 54% $5,710,182 77% 
Terminal Rental Charge $5,012,217 $5,554,460 11% $6,783,705 35% $6,034,518 20% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$1,431,880 $1,385,149 -3% $1,424,438 -1% $2,122,807 48% 
Rental Cars $3,024,062 $2,854,422 -6% $2,768,177 -8% $2,672,418 -12%
Parking $7,043,032 $8,585,782 22% $8,342,849 18% $8,910,565 27% 
Passenger Facility Charges $4,729,277 $4,513,607 -5% $4,125,044 -13% $3,871,885 -18%
Operating Expenses $16,541,229 $18,779,363 14% $19,431,061 17% $21,511,641 30% 
Law Enforcement $858,274 $929,862 8% $1,500,000 75% $1,650,000 92% 
Net Profit $10,299,584 $3,264,251 -68% $913,392 -91% -$19,662,161  
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
In the expense category, law enforcement increased by 8 
percent for 2001, 75 percent for 2002, and 92 percent for 
2003. Operating expenses increased by 14 percent for 2001, an 
additional 3 percent for a 17 percent increase for 2002, and a 
30 percent increase for 2003, when compared to the expenses of 
the calendar year of 2000. Landing fee revenues show an 
increasing trend for all years studied with increases of 35 
percent, 54 percent, and 77 percent for the years 2001, 2002, 
and 2003 respectively. As for the revenue category terminal 
services, there were slight declines in 2001 of 3 percent and 
2002 of 1 percent, but an astonishing increase of 48 percent 
when the year 2003 is compared to the year 2000. Revenue from 
passenger facility charges was reduced by 5 percent in 2001, 
13 percent in 2002, and 18 percent in 2003. Parking revenue 
was up 22 percent in 2001; it dropped slightly in 2002, but 
still up 22 percent compared to 2000, and in 2003 the revenue 
generated from parking fees had increased by 27 percent from 
the year 2000.  Rental car revenue was also down for all three 
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years following the base year of 2000. The revenue generated 
was down 6 percent in 2001, 8 percent in 2002, and 12 percent 
in 2003.  
 Portland International Jetport in Maine was the airport 
studied from the small hub category for the northeast region. 
The financial data collected through the FAA reporting forms 
is presented in Table 13. 
Table 13. Financial Data Portland International Jetport 
Portland International Jetport, ME 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $1,482,285 $1,719,710 16% $2,094,864 41% $1,764,187 19% 
Terminal Rental Charge $1,969,262 $2,208,152 12% $1,912,811 -3% $2,111,340 7% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$735,377 $495,323 -33% $712,852 -3% $465,023 -37%
Rental Cars $2,189,940 $2,409,136 10% $1,850,617 -15% $2,390,767 9% 
Parking $2,757,940 $2,919,442 6% $1,926,194 -30% $2,107,272 -24%
Passenger Facility Charges $1,944,621 $1,779,596 -8% $1,461,677 -25% $1,536,459 -21%
Operating Expenses $5,968,312 $5,947,794 0% $5,663,007 -5% $6,552,250 10% 
Law Enforcement $170,425 $263,292 54% $1,305,284 666% $1,352,820 694%
Net Profit $7,821,346 $6,234,734 -20% $5,339,462 -32% $3,783,384 -52%
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
Both revenues from landing fees and terminal services show 
some interesting changes throughout the 4 year period studied. 
Revenues from landing fees in 2001 had increased by 16 
percentage points and for 2002 the increase was 41 percent. In 
2003 the increase dropped back down to a more modest increase 
of 19 percent compared to 2000, or a 19 percent decline from 
2002. Income from terminal services provided was down 33 
percent in 2001, 3 percent in 2002, and 37 percent in 2003; 
the change from 2002 to 2003 was a decline of 35 percent. In 
comparison to 2000 numbers, rental car revenue increased by 10 
percent for 2001 and decreased by 30 percent for 2002 and 24 
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percent for 2002. Passenger facility charges retained by 
Portland International Jetport were reduced by 8 percent for 
2001, 25 percent for 2002, and 21 percent for 2003. As for 
expenses, Law enforcement expenses reported in 2001 showed an 
increase of 54 percent compared to 2000, but this number had 
in 2002 and 2003 increased by 666 percent and 694 percent 
respectively. Operating expenses actually remained status quo 
for 2001 and declined by 5 percentage points for 2002, and 
then in 2003 increased by a rather modest amount of 10 percent 
when compared to 2000, but a 15 percent increase from the 
previous years’ operating expenses. 
 The south region was the final region to be studied and 
George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas, was 
the large hub airport used. The financial data for George Bush 
Intercontinental Airport can be found in Table 14. 
Table 14. Financial Data George Bush Intercontinental Airport 
George Bush Intercontinental, TX 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $25,221,000 $33,621,729 33% $37,626,124 49% $36,180,501 43% 
Terminal Rental Charge $55,107,000 $54,789,909 -1% $62,874,162 14% $69,248,493 26% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$22,383,000 $16,832,878 -25% $17,340,577 -23% $20,345,733 -9% 
Rental Cars $12,843,000 $13,080,754 2% $11,604,858 -10% $10,878,752 -15%
Parking $33,758,000 $43,389,303 29% $38,916,959 15% $42,489,013 26% 
Passenger Facility Charges $0 $0  $0  $0  
Operating Expenses $82,774,000 $93,358,930 13% $106,098,267 28% $118,591,626 43% 
Law Enforcement $10,282,000 $11,230,165 9% $19,227,434 87% $14,635,062 42% 
Net Profit $54,704,000 $57,935,013 6% $83,416,032 52% -$71,431,843  
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
At George Bush Intercontinental Airport, landing fees climbed 
by 33 percent for 2001 and 49 percent for 2002. In 2003 there 
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was a reduction compared to 2002, but still an increase of 43 
percent when compared to the base year of 2000. For the years 
2001 to 2003, revenues generated through services provided at 
the terminal were all below that of 2000. There was a 
reduction in revenue of 25 percent for 2001, 23 percent for 
2002, and 9 percent for 2003, which on the bright side was an 
increase of 17 percent from 2002. For the year 2001, there was 
a slight increase in revenue generated through rental car 
agreements of 2 percent, but for 2002 this revenue decreased 
by 10 percent and for 2003 it dropped another 5 percentage 
points to a total reduction of 15 percent. Parking fees 
increased by 29 percent in 2001, and when compared to 2000 
there was still an increase of 15 percent in 2002 and 26 
percent in 2003, but both these numbers are below that of 
2001, indicating a potential loss. Operating expenses 
increased steadily throughout the time period studied by 13 
percent for 2001, 28 percent for 2002, and 43 percent for 
2003. As for law enforcement, the increase in the reported 
expense was 9 percent in 2001, 87 percent in 2002, and 42 
percent in 2003, a drop of 25 percent from the previous year. 
 Will Rogers World Airport in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma was 
selected as the representative for the medium hub category in 
the south region and its financial data is presented in Table 
15. 
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Table 15. Financial Data Will Rogers World International 
Airport 
Will Rogers World, OK 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $3,881,134 $3,818,004 -2% $3,980,877 3% $4,257,115 10% 
Terminal Rental Charge $1,929,481 $2,009,882 4% $1,883,516 -2% $1,642,491 -15%
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$931,258   $1,028,353 10% $968,174 4% 
Rental Cars $3,393,377 $3,064,494 -10% $3,051,780 -10% $3,033,242 -11%
Parking $6,245,301 $6,278,015 1% $5,246,596 -16% $5,202,983 -17%
Passenger Facility Charges $4,862,830 $4,837,440 -1% $4,420,587 -9% $4,315,374 -11%
Operating Expenses $12,940,233 $14,170,634 10% $17,047,899 32% $18,188,035 41% 
Law Enforcement $1,417,664   $1,989,983 40% $3,194,578 125%
Net Profit $31,903,161 $40,224,876 26% $11,815,730 -63% $2,109,648 -93%
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
From 2000 to 2001, landing fees generated at Will Rogers World 
Airport dropped by percent. In 2002 they were up by 3 percent 
from 2000, and in 2003 they had increased by 10 percent in 
comparison to 2000 numbers. Revenues generated through its 
terminal services were up 10 percent in 2002 and 4 percent in 
2003, a slight drop from the previous year of 6 percent. The 
decrease in rental car revenue remained consistent for the 
years 2001 to 2003 at 10 percent below the 2000 level for 2001 
and 2002 and 11 percent for 2003. Parking fees were up 1 
percentage point in 2001, but dropped 16 percent for 2002 and 
17 percent for 2003. Passenger facility charges also show a 
downward trend by being reduced by 1 percent for 2001, 9 
percent for 2002, and 11 percent for 2003. In 2001, the 
operating expenses had increased by 10 percent compared to 
2000; this increase was 32 percent by the end of 2002 and 41 
percent by the end of 2003. Law enforcement expenses show a 
similar trend as that of other airports studied and in 2002 
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the expenses had increased by 40 percent and in 2003 the 
increase was 125 percent. 
 The last airport to be studied was Huntsville 
International Airport in Alabama; this airport belongs to the 
category of small hub airports and Table 16 presents the 
financial data for Huntsville International Airport. 
Table 16. Financial Data Huntsville International Airport 
Huntsville International, AL 
 2000 2001 ∆% 2002 ∆% 2003 ∆% 
Landing Fees $1,773,664 $2,025,244 14% $1,725,710 -3% $2,055,857 16%
Terminal Rental Charge $2,587,724 $2,557,145 -1% $1,839,690 -29% $2,761,905 7% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
$491,155 $469,406 -4% $486,429 -1% $589,713 20%
Rental Cars $1,845,982 $1,959,411 6% $1,735,210 -6% $2,040,916 11%
Parking $3,742,837 $3,987,282 7% $2,865,564 -23% $4,292,598 15%
Passenger Facility Charges $1,371,823 $1,385,202 1% $1,383,056 1% $1,228,916 -10%
Operating Expenses $11,682,519 $12,240,712 5% $10,883,982 -7% $13,079,017 12%
Law Enforcement        
Net Profit $14,110,146 $6,142,696 -56% $14,479,859 3% $6,728,345 -52%
Source: FAA Form 5100-126 & 5100-127 
 
Landing fees were in 2001 up 14 percent and in 2003 up 16 
percent. The year immediately following the terrorist attacks 
they were down 3 percent, or down 15 percent from 2001. Income 
through services provided at the terminal were down 4 percent 
in 2001 and 1 percent in 2002, but rebounded in 2003 and had 
by the end of the year increased by 20 percent. Rental car 
revenues were up for all years except 2002 when it experienced 
a reduction of 6 percent. In 2001 the increase was 6 percent 
and in 2003 it was 11 percent. Parking fees experienced the 
same trend as that of rental car revenues by increases of 7 
percent in 2001 and 15 percent in 2003, but a reduction of 23 
percent for 2002. For Huntsville International Airport, 
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revenue generated through the passenger facility charges 
remained steady for 2001 and 2002, but took a hit in 2003 when 
they dropped by 10 percent. There were no reported law 
enforcement expenses so that category was not analyzed for 
this airport, As for operating expenses, there was a modest 
increase of 5 percent for 2001 and 12 percent by the end of 
2003, and even a reduction of 7 percent for 2002.  
 To compare the airports within each hub category, the 
percentage changes for all years studied and for each 
financial category were averaged and entered into a table. The 
result is shown in Table 17. 
Table 17. Airport Category Comparison 
 Large Hub Medium Hub Small Hub 













Landing Fees -1% 49% 10% 42% 24% 27% 55% 3% -14% 8% 25% 9% 
Terminal Rental Charge 9% 11% 8% 13% 44% 14% 22% -4% 75% 33% 5% -8% 
Terminal 
food/beverage/retail/other 13% -8% -16% -18% 67% 4% 14%   -13% -24% 5% 
Rental Cars 9% -9% -9% -7% 21% -8% -8% -10%  6% 1% 4% 
Parking 11% -9% -0% 23% 30% -8% 22% -10% 6% 57% -16% -1% 
Passenger Facility Charges 0% -59% -23%  35% 34% -11% -7% 10% 39% -18% -3% 
Operating Expenses 21% 14% 17% 28% 38% -55% 20% 27% 16% 30% 1% 3% 
Law Enforcement 49%   46% 357%  58%   148% 471%  
Net Profit -62%  -54% 29% 106% -64% -79% -43%  -17% -35% -35%
 
Cells without numbers indicate areas where there was 
insufficient information to obtain a valid and reliable 
average to represent the time period being studied.  For the 
large hub airports, the majority of the categories have 
numbers which have changed negatively compared to the year 
2000 numbers. It shows that the average change in parking 
revenues for the large hub airport in the midwest region was a 
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reduction of 9.5 percent. 
 Table 18 shows a similar comparison in which each region 
is compared to the other three regions. The financial data has 
been averaged over the three years of changes and over the 
airport categories as well, leaving each region represented by 
one number. 
Table 18. Geographical Region Comparison 
 West Midwest Northea
st 
South 
Landing Fees 3.0% 28.2% 30.3% 18.2% 
Terminal Rental Charge 43.1% 19.8% 11.9% 0.3% 
Terminal  
food/beverage/retail/other 
 -5.6% -8.6%  
Rental Cars  -3.9% -5.7% -4.8% 
Parking 16.3% 13.0% 2.0% 3.9% 
Passenger Facility Charges 15.4% 4.8% -17.8%  
Operating Expenses 25.3% -3.7% 13.1% 19.5% 
Law Enforcement     
Net Profit   -40.7% -16.5% 
 
As for Table 17, the empty cells indicate insufficient 
information available to obtain a valid and reliable number. 
Table 18 shows that in the northeast region, operating 
expenses for the three airports selected, when seen as one, 
increased by 13.1 percent.  
 Figure 1 shows the passenger enplanement data for the 
time period 2000-2003 for the airports used in this study. 
According to the enplanement data published by the FAA and 
presented in Figure 1, the number of passengers remained 
fairly stable for most airports. The one airport that had the 
most significant reduction in number of enplanements was Logan 
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International Airport in Boston. Oakland International Airport 
shows a steady increase in its enplanement numbers throughout 
the time period studied. Cincinnati/Kentucky International 
Airport also had a very significant drop in enplanements from 
2000 to 2001, but rebounded more than Logan International 






































































SUMMARY, COCNLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The purpose of this study was to analyze the economical 
impact of September 11, 2001, on airports’ revenues, expenses, 
and the resulting changes to profit margins. The study was 
entirely quantitative using only financial data publicly 
available through the Federal Aviation Administration and 
submitted in accordance with federal regulations. The 
financial data was presented through the use of tables, which 
at the same time simplified the analysis of the data.  
Summary 
 This study attempted to answer the following research 
questions:  
4. What is the financial impact on airports of September 11, 
2001?  
5. How do small, medium, and large hub airports compare as 
to how they are affected financially by the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001?  
6. How are the different geographical regions affected by 
September 11, 2001? 
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This summary is based on the data presented in Chapter IV and 
will refer to those tables when applicable. The financial data 
was used to show trends and changes over the four year period 
from 2000 to 2004. Tables 5 through 16 show the financial date 
for each individual airport that was randomly selected for 
this study. The financial data used was the data deemed most 
volatile when it comes to the number of passengers and number 
of flights to and from an airport. The airports used in this 
study were selected through a stratified random sampling 
process to achieve an unbiased sample of airports. 
 It was expected that all airports would be different, but 
throughout the analysis it was also expected to see a trend as 
to how the airports were affected after September 11, 2001. 
Airports within the same hub category were compared as well as 
one region to the other. Table 17 was compiled by using 
information from the tables representing each airport and was 
used for the comparison of airports belonging to the same hub 
category.  
When comparing the large hub airports, the numbers 
clearly show that the midwest and the northeast experienced a 
more downward economical turn than the airports in the west 
and south regions. All numbers in Table 17 are the average of 
the changes from 2000 to 2001, 2001 to 2002, and 2002 to 2003, 
and they clearly show what the trend was for the selected 
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airports in their respective geographical region. According to 
Table 17, the west region seems to be the least affected over 
the time period studied.  
The main categories for revenue analysis were landing 
fees, terminal rental charges, terminal food, beverage, 
retail, and other, rental cars, parking, and passenger 
facility charges. Over the four years studied, Mc Carran 
International Airport in Las Vegas, Nevada, only showed a 
slight reduction of landing fees of 1.6 percent, the only 
airport in this category showing any reduction at all. The 
other three airports in the same category showed from modest 
to very good increases in landing fee revenue generated. The 
airports in both the northeast and midwest regions had 
negative numbers for all revenue categories except landing 
fees and terminal rental charge; however, a further analysis 
of those numbers shows a similar trend for rental car revenue 
in which both airports have a reduction in revenue of 
approximately ten percent. The other categories were affected 
differently among the two regions. The other category in which 
only the midwest and east regions were affected was parking 
revenue; Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport, 
representing the midwest region, experienced almost a ten 
percent drop in these revenues and Logan International 
Airport, representing the northeast region, only experienced a 
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meager reduction of less than one half of a percentage point. 
The other two regions had revenue increases of twelve and 
twenty three percent for the west and south regions 
respectively. The main expense categories that were studied 
were operating expenses and law enforcement expenses and as 
for these two categories, all four airports considered as 
large hub airports show alarmingly large increases when it 
comes to changes in law enforcement expenses. Even though law 
enforcement expenses were not reported for all years for all 
airports, the trend was clearly visible.  
Medium hub airports show to many degrees a similar trend 
as to the large hub airports. The airport selected to 
represent the west, Metropolitan Oakland International 
Airport, was the airport which was affected the least over the 
years studied. Over the four year period, there were no 
negative trends regarding revenue categories for this airport. 
However, for the other three regions there were several 
categories in which there were significant reductions of 
revenues. The airport in the midwest region experienced an 
average reduction in parking revenue and rental car revenue of 
eight percent. Both the airports for the other two regions had 
rental car revenue decreases of eight percent for the 
northeast region and ten percent for the south region. Will 
Rogers World Airport in Oklahoma City had a decline of parking 
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fee revenue of almost eleven percent while the airport in the 
midwest region, Indianapolis International Airport, 
experienced an average increase of more than twenty two 
percent for the same time period. Furthermore, the medium hub 
airports show the same trend as the large hub airports when it 
comes to the expense categories with operating expenses 
increasing by thirty eight percent for the west region 
airport, twenty percent for the northeast region airport, and 
twenty seven percent for the south region airport. 
Interestingly enough, the Indianapolis International Airport 
in the midwest region, showed an average decrease of fifty 
five percent for this time period. However, when looking at 
Table 9, it can be seen that the operating expenses reported 
for 2000 were extraordinarily high when compared to any other 
year and from 2001 to 2003 there has been a rather significant 
increase of thirty percent. Law enforcement expenses also 
follow the trend set forth by the large hub airports and have 
increased significantly for all airports which have reported 
these costs 
The last comparison of airports by size was done for the 
small hub category and once again the trends were similar to 
those found for the other two categories already analyzed. The 
west region showed very few signs of a recession during the 
years 2000 to 2003 and the only revenue categories in which 
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there were declines were for landing fees, with an average 
reduction of fourteen percent over the four years, and in 
revenue from terminal services, where the decline from 2000 to 
2002 was five percent and from 2000 to 2003 was 2 percent. 
There was no revenue reported for 2001 in the latter category 
for Palm Springs International Airport so an average number 
for the three years following the base year of 2000 was not 
available. Both the midwest and south region airports 
experienced an increase in parking revenues and passenger 
facility charges, but the other two regions both experienced 
declines of sixteen and one percent in parking fees and 
eighteen and three percent for passenger facility charges for 
the northeast and south regions respectively. The expense 
categories studied both showed the same trends as the other 
two regions previously analyzed as well. All four regions had 
an increase in operating expenses as well as law enforcement 
expenses.  
In Table 18 the comparison of airports and regions was 
taken one step further by averaging the percentage changes in 
Tables 5 through 16 collapsed over the regions, disregarding 
what airport category the different airports belonged to. This 
was done to verify the results from analyzing Table 17 and to 
find out whether or not there are any differences among the 
four regions when considered as a whole. The data as presented 
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in Table 18 verifies the conclusions drawn from Table 17 as 
well; it seems like the northeast region had the largest 
economical downturn during the time period from 2000 to 2003 
that was analyzed in this study. The table also shows that the 
west was the least impacted during the same time period while 
the midwest and south regions were more or less equally 
affected. 
Figure 1 was compiled using enplanement data for the 
selected airports, and this data was obtained from the 
official FAA statistics for passenger enplanement and cargo 
data. This table was used to show trends as to how the number 
of passengers flying to and from the airports in this study 
changed between 2000 and 2003. It was expected that this data 
would follow the same trends as the financial data which was 
analyzed. When it comes to enplanement data, the west and 
south regions show the least reduction in the number of 
enplanements while the northeast and midwest regions, and the 
large hubs in particular, have a much larger drop in the 
number of enplanements; which was expected after the analysis 
of the financial data where the northeast consistently was 
more affected than the other regions and the west was less 
affected than any of the other regions. The figure also 
clearly shows that the airports in the large hub category have 
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a much larger percentage wise drop in their enplanements from 
2000 to 2001 than any of the other airport categories.  
Conclusions 
 Throughout the analysis of the study there were certain 
trends that became very obvious and the most significant trend 
was regarding geographical location. It seemed like the 
physical distance from the actually location of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, played a major factor in how 
the different airports were impacted during the time period 
analyzed. The west region, being the farthest away from the 
incidents, show less of an economic impact both when it comes 
to declines in revenues and the number of enplanements. As the 
airports then were located closer and closer to the east 
coast, the location of the terrorist attacks, the numbers 
showed an increasingly negative trend for revenues as well as 
enplanements, indicating that people’s perception of the 
terrorist attacks may be different regarding the geographical 
region they live in.  
 There may be several reasons why the law enforcement 
expenses increased the way they did during this time period. 
It is assumed that the main reason is the new emphasis on 
security and the new security regulations that were mandated 
by the FAA shortly after September 11, 2001. Other reasons may 
also be a shift of the responsibility as to who is responsible 
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for these expenses. FAA Form 5100-126 shows the law 
enforcement expenses occurred by local, state, and federal 
agencies which the airport authority had to reimburse. These 
expenses may have been more hidden previously and therefore 
fallen in under other expense categories not analyzed in this 
study.  
 During the stratified random selection process, Logan 
International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, was one of the 
airports selected and it was immediately considered that this 
airport may not be a very good indicator since it was more 
affected physically than any other airport that was selected. 
However, the thorough analysis of the financial data removed 
any doubts in the investigator’s mind that the selection of 
this specific airport was skewering any numbers when it was 
compared to other airports in the same geographical region. 
There were other factors that were of concern as well when 
considering the tourism attraction of certain airports, and 
then especially regarding Palm Springs International Airport 
in California and Mc Carran International Airport in Las 
Vegas, Nevada. Mc Carran International Airport may be a very 
difficult airport to analyze because of its location and the 
city itself. Since two of the revenue categories analyzed were 
rental cars and parking fees, the local area of the airport 
may make a difference. As for Mc Carran International Airport, 
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there may not be a reflective amount of people renting cars at 
that location since Las Vegas will often be the final point of 
travel in which there will be very little use of a rental car. 
Mc Carran International may also not be the perfect airport of 
origin since most travelers to and from this airport will be 
tourists, not leaving their vehicles parked at the airport 
property for extended periods of time generating valuable 
revenue. Mc Carran International Airport also has slot 
machines in the terminal which are guaranteed to generate 
millions of dollars in revenue in a way that other airports in 
other states are not able to do. Even though these factors 
were of concern, it was decided that no airport selected 
through the random selection process was to be replaced; this 
was done to ensure that the sampling process was fair and 
valid. No matter which airports would be selected, there will 
always be some factor that may seem to disqualify the airport 
as a valid candidate for the research, but by staying with the 
results from the stratified random sampling all airports in 
all four geographical regions had the same chance of being 
selected.  
 There is no question that expenses have increased over 
the last four years for all airports in this study, but there 
was a difference as to how much they increased individually. 
Some airports showed a fivefold increase in law enforcement 
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expenses while others had more modest increases; however, the 
conclusion is that following September 11, 2001, all airports 
experienced an increase in their expenses caused by the new 
and more stringent security regulations mandated by the FAA. 
With the increase in expenses and decrease in revenues, the 
airports’ profit margins have decreased significantly in the 
years following September 11, 2001. 
Recommendations 
 There is more research needed on this topic to verify the 
findings of this study. It is suggested that it will be 
beneficial to expand the sample to include a minimum of three 
airports from each category within each geographical region. 
This will give a better picture of the average revenues and 
expenses experienced for the different airports when compared 
to one another. Research can also be done in which a deeper 
analysis of the results is made through the use of statistical 
methods, and in order to accomplish this the data most be 
obtainable for all revenue and expense categories for all 
airports and this can be achieved through the use of 










FAA/OST Task Force Study (1999). Airport business practices 
and their impact on airline competition. FAA/OST. 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2005). FAA Form 5100-126 
[Data File]. Available from Federal Aviation 
Administration Web site, http://www.faa.gov 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2005). FAA Form 5100-127 
[Data File]. Available from Federal Aviation 
Administration Web site, http://www.faa.gov 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2005). Enplanement Data 
[Data File]. Available from Federal Aviation 
Administration Web site, http://www.faa.gov 
Macias, Gini & Company (2001). John Wayne Airport Financial 
Statements, 2000-2001. Los Angeles, CA. 
Office of Finance (2002). 2001 comprehensive annual financial 
report. Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority, 
Washington DC. 
Quilty, S.M. (1999). Airport fees, rates, and charges. 




Quilty, S.M. (1999). Financial management and accounting. 
American Association of Airport Executives. Alexandria, 
VA. 
Quilty, S.M. (1999). Airport capital development and funding. 
American Association of Airport Executives. Alexandria, 
VA. 
Quilty, S.M. (1999). The management functions. American 
Association of Airport Executives. Alexandria, VA. 
Quilty, S.M. (1999). Management theories, roles, motivation, 
and communication. American Association of Airport 
Executives. Alexandria, VA. 
United States General Accounting Office (2002). Using airport 
grant funds for security projects has affected some 
development projects. GAO, Washington DC. 
Wells, A.T. (1996). Airport Planning & Management, 3rd Ed. Blue 
Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books. 
 56
